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THE SECRET OF MY SUCCESS
ABSTRACT. In an information state where various agents have both factual
knowledge and knowledge about each other, announcements can be made that
change the state of information. Such informative announcements can have the
curious property that they become false because they are announced. The most
typical example of that is ‘fact p is true and you don’t know that’, after which
you know that p, which entails the negation of the announcement formula. The
announcement of such a formula in a given information state is called an unsuc-
cessful update. A successful formula is a formula that always becomes common
knowledge after being announced. Analysis of information systems and ‘philo-
sophical puzzles’ reveals a growing number of dynamic phenomena that can be
described or explained by unsuccessful updates. This increases our understanding
of such philosophical problems. We also investigate the syntactic characterization
of the successful formulas.
Heraclitus
As they step into the same rivers, other and
still other waters ﬂow upon them. (D. 12.
Translation by C. H. Kahn (Kahn, 1979).)
1. INTRODUCTION
Suppose we discuss New Zealand trees, and I tell you: “You don’t
know that I have a kowhai tree in my garden”. Before I said so,
you did not know that I owned such a tree, but after the announce-
ment, that is no longer true: now you do know. In the dynamic epi-
stemic logics in Gerbrandy (1999) and van Ditmarsch (2000) this is
called an unsuccessful update: a formula that becomes false after its
announcement. Formally, it is a ϕ such that 〈ϕ〉¬ϕ is true in some
model. Here 〈ϕ〉 is a dynamic modal operator for the announce-
ment of ϕ. If atom p describes that I have a kowhai tree in my
garden, then Kyoup stands for ‘You know that p’, and the unsuc-
cessful update is Kme(p ∧ ¬Kyoup), because 〈Kme(p ∧ ¬Kyoup)〉
¬Kme(p∧¬Kyoup) is true.
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There are different logical approaches for reasoning about infor-
mation change. Besides dynamic epistemic logic, there are most
notably belief revision and temporal epistemic logic. The issue of
unsuccessful updates does not arise in the belief revision or in tem-
poral epistemic logic, as we will argue here. Therefore we will use
dynamic epistemic logic to provide a satisfactory analysis of unsuc-
cessful updates, and use it to analyze problems and puzzles where
unsuccessful updates occur.
One of the most inﬂuential logical theories about information
change is belief revision (Alchourro´n et al. 1985). It distinguishes
three types of information change: expansion, contraction, and revi-
sion. Expansion is very much like an announcement, i.e. new infor-
mation which is consistent with the agent’s current information
is acquired. A notable difference between AGM expansion and
announcements is that success is a postulate for expansion but not
a requirement for announcements. Within AGM belief revision this
can be achieved because expansion is typically on so-called objec-
tive formulas only, i.e., formulas without modal operators. In our
current setting, such AGM belief revision corresponds to announce-
ments of facts and their boolean combinations, and in this setting
these are not very interesting.
In the theory of belief revision, expansion is fully characterized
by six rationality postulates (Ga¨rdenfors 1988), and turns out to be
set-theoretic union. Consequently, repeated expansion with the same
formula has the same effect as expanding once, and the order in
which the expansions are executed does not matter. But in the cur-
rent context these become immediately and unmistakably crucial:
for example, after I say “you do not know that I have a kowhai tree
in my garden,” I cannot say that again: the revision cannot be re-
peated. And even though I can ﬁrst say “you can imagine that I do
not have a kowhai tree in my garden” and only then say “(but actu-
ally I have one in my garden and) you do not know that (I have a
kowhai tree in my garden),” I cannot reverse the order of these two
announcements: after the last, the ﬁrst can no longer be made.
There are also temporal epistemic logics for reasoning about
information change (Fagin et al. 1995). In these approaches infor-
mation change occurs as time progresses, however the propositional
content of information change cannot be expressed in the logical
language. This is because the temporal operators are not in them-
selves descriptive of the change. For example, your knowledge after
my announcement of “you do not know that I have a kowhai tree
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in my garden” can be described by XKyoup, where X is the ‘next’-
operator that assumes an underlying transition between an informa-
tion state before and after the announcement. But the X here does
not reveal anything about the nature of the announcement. In other
words, the issue of unsuccessful update does not arise in this ap-
proach either.
The issue of unsuccessful updates is closely related to Moore’s
problem (Hintikka 1962; Sorensen 1988), which concerns sentences
that can be true, but that cannot be known to someone. These
Moore-sentences may be unsuccessful updates. For example, p∧¬Kp
is satisﬁable, but K(p∧¬Kp) is inconsistent in epistemic logic. The
relation with our running example will be obvious. We do not pres-
ent Moore-problems in this paper separately.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we
deﬁne the logic of public announcements and various notions of
successful and unsuccessful formulas and updates. This ﬁne-tuning
in terminology and corresponding semantics provides the available
tools for the analysis of various problems and puzzles.
Sections 4–7 are entirely devoted to the analysis of problems, or
problem areas, that can be resolved by using the notion of unsuc-
cessful updates. Section 4 deals with the Muddy Children prob-
lem. The epistemic paradox known as the Surprise Examination
paradox is discussed in Section 5. Card games are the subject of
Section 6. In Section 7 security protocols are analyzed. In Sec-
tion 8 we present different attempts to characterize the success-
ful formulas and a small technical contribution to that ongoing
discussion.
2. THE LOGIC OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS
In this section, we present the logic of public announcements with
common knowledge. This logic contains both epistemic and dy-
namic modal operators. With epistemic operators we express indi-
vidual knowledge, for an arbitrary agent, and public (common)
knowledge, for the entire group of agents. With dynamic modal
operators we express the effect of public announcements, i.e., pub-
lic (and truthful) announcements of formulas in the language. The
parameters that play a static role throughout the semantic and syn-
tactic deﬁnitions are a set of agents N and a set of propositional
atoms P .
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An epistemic model M =〈S,∼, V 〉 consists of a domain S of fac-
tual states or just states, accessibility ∼: N → P(S × S) which for
each agent n ∈ N deﬁnes a binary accessibility relation (that is an
equivalence relation) ∼n on S, and a valuation V :P →P(S) which
for each atom p ∈ P deﬁnes a valuation Vp ⊆ S. The class of epi-
stemic models is named S5N(P ). If M is an epistemic model, and
s ∈D(M) (s is in the domain of M), then the pointed model (M, s)
is an epistemic state.
The language of public announcements LuN(P ) is inductively de-
ﬁned as
ϕ ::= p|¬ϕ | (ϕ∧ψ) |Knϕ| Cϕ | [ϕ]ψ
We assume the reader to be familiar with the interpretation of the
propositional and epistemic operators. Intuitively, Knϕ stands for
‘agent n knows ϕ,’, and Cϕ stands for ‘it is common knowledge that
ϕ.’ The construct [ϕ]ψ stands for ‘after truthful public announce-
ment of ϕ, it holds that ψ ’. Instead of ‘ϕ is a public and truth-
ful announcement’ we say ‘ϕ is an announcement’. The dual of [ϕ]
is 〈ϕ〉, so that 〈ϕ〉ψ stands for ‘after some announcement of ϕ, it
holds that ψ ’. As announcements are functional, 〈ϕ〉ψ entails [ϕ]ψ .
Notational abbreviations are deﬁned as usual, including – assuming
a ﬁnite number of agents – general knowledge Eϕ.
The language LuN(P ) is interpreted on epistemic models and epi-
stemic states. Given an epistemic model M =〈S,∼, V 〉∈S5N(P ) and
a state s ∈D(M), we deﬁne inductively:
M,s |=p :⇔ s ∈Vp
M, s |=¬ϕ :⇔ M,s 	|=ϕ
M, s |=ϕ∧ψ :⇔ M,s |=ϕ and M,s |=ψ
M, s |=Knϕ :⇔ for all t ∈S : s ∼n t implies M, t |=ϕ
M, s |=Cϕ :⇔ for all t ∈S : s ∼N t implies M, t |=ϕ
M, s |= [ϕ]ψ :⇔ M,s |=ϕ implies M|ϕ, s |=ψ
In the clause for Cϕ, access ∼N is deﬁned as the reﬂexive transitive
closure of the union of access for all individual agents, i.e., ∼N :=
(
⋃
n∈N ∼n)∗. In the clause for [ϕ]ψ , M|ϕ :=〈S ′,∼′, V ′〉 is deﬁned as
follows:
S ′ := {s ′ ∈S | M,s ′ |=ϕ}
∼′n := ∼n ∩(S ′ ×S ′)
V ′p := Vp ∩S ′
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In other words: the model M|ϕ is the model M restricted to all the
states where ϕ holds, including access between states. The interpre-
tation of the dual 〈ϕ〉 of [ϕ] is obvious: M,s |= 〈ϕ〉ψ if and only if
M,s |= ϕ and M|ϕ, s |=ψ . Validity, and validity in models, are de-
ﬁned as usual. Example interpretations are given in Section 4 on the
Muddy Children Problem.
A proof system for this logic is found in Table I. It is a special
case of the general proof system for the logic of epistemic actions
presented in Baltag et al. (2003), with precursors in Plaza (1989)
and Gerbrandy (1999). Soundness and completeness is shown for
the general proof system.1 The principles relating announcements to
knowledge are the axiom announcement and knowledge, which also
(partly) expresses that an announcement is a partial function, and
the derivation rule announcement and common knowledge, which is a
recipe to derive common knowledge after an announcement. Other
valid principles include:
[ϕ](ψ →χ)→ ([ϕ]ψ → [ϕ]χ) normality for [ϕ]
C(ϕ→Eϕ)→ϕ→Cϕ induction
〈ϕ〉ψ → [ϕ]ψ functionality of announcement
[ϕ]ψ ↔ (ϕ→ [ϕ]ψ) truthful announcement
TABLE I
The logic of public announcements
All propositional tautologies




C(ϕ→ψ)→Cϕ→Cψ normality of C
Cϕ→ (ϕ∧ECϕ) use of C
 [ϕ]p↔ (ϕ→p) announcement and atoms
 [ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (ϕ→¬[ϕ]ψ) announcement and negation
 [ϕ](ψ ∧χ)↔ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ) announcement and conjunction
 [ϕ]Knψ ↔ (ϕ→Kn[ϕ]ψ) announcement and knowledge
from ϕ and ϕ→ψ follows ψ modus ponens
from ϕ follows Knϕ necessitation for Kn
from ϕ follows Cϕ necessitation for C
from ϕ follows  [ψ ]ϕ necessitation for [ψ ]
from χ → [ϕ]ψ and
χ ∧ϕ→Eχ follows χ → [ϕ]Cψ announcement and
common knowledge
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Some of these can be derived schematically, while others need an
induction on one of the occurring formula variables. For exam-
ple, both ‘induction’ is a schematic consequence of the ‘rule of
announcement and common knowledge’. The logic of public
announcements is not a normal modal logic, because uniform sub-
stitution is not a derivation rule: the whole point of this investi-
gation is, that even though [q]q is valid, [p ∧ ¬Kp](p ∧ ¬Kp) is
invalid! The logic of public announcements is decidable, see Baltag
et al. (2003). For details on the overview in this section, see van
Ditmarsch et al. (2005).
3. SUCCESSFUL FORMULAS
In this section, we deﬁne successful and unsuccessful formulas by
their semantic properties. The logic of public announcement with
common knowledge provides a sufﬁcient logical context for these
deﬁnitions.
Let us recapitulate once more the communicative expectations,
and how we can be so thoroughly deceived by these. If an agent
truthfully announces ϕ to a group of agents, it appears on ﬁrst sight
to be the case that (s)he ‘makes ϕ common knowledge’ that way: in
other words, if ϕ holds, then after announcing that, Cϕ holds. In
other words, that ϕ→ [ϕ]Cϕ is valid. We have seen in the introduc-
tion that this expectation is unwarranted, because the truth of epi-
stemic parts of the formula may be inﬂuenced by its announcement.
But sometimes the expectation is warranted after all: formulas that
always become common knowledge after being announced, will be
called successful. We can also distinguish various degrees of success,
depending on the context of an epistemic state. Let us see what the
possibilities are.
After announcing ϕ, ϕ sometimes remains true and sometimes
becomes false, and this depends both on the formula and on the
epistemic state. The introductory example involved an epistemic
state for one atom p and two agents, from now on called Anne
and Bill, where Anne knows the truth about p but Bill doesn’t.
This epistemic state is formally deﬁned as (Letter,1), where model
Letter has domain {0,1}, accessibility relation for agent a is ∼a :=
{(0,0), (1,1)} (that is: the identity on the domain), accessibility rela-
tion for agent b is ∼b :={(0,0), (1,1), (0,1), (1,0)} (that is: the uni-
versal relation on the domain), and valuation Vp ={1}. The model
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is called Letter because it can be seen as the result of (only) Anne
reading a letter which contains the truth about p.
If in this epistemic state (Letter,1) Anne says, truthfully: “I
know that p,” then after this announcement Kap, it remains true
that Kap:
Letter,1 |= [Kap]Kap
This is, because in Letter the formula Kap is true in state 1 only,
so that the model Letter|Kap consists of the singleton state 1,
with reﬂexive access for a and b. It also becomes common knowl-
edge that Anne knows p: we have that Letter,1 |= [Kap]CKap; al-
though in this particular case of the singleton model (Letter|Kap),
a description involving common knowledge is not very informative.
But it is not always the case that announced formulas remain
true. In the given epistemic state (Letter,1), Anne could on the
other hand have said as well, to Bill: “You don’t know that p.” The
actual implicature in this case is “Fact p is true and you don’t know
that.” After this announcement Ka(p ∧¬Kbp), that also only suc-
ceeds in state 1, Bill knows that p, therefore Ka(p ∧ ¬Kbp) is no
longer true
Letter,1 |= [Ka(p∧¬Kbp)]¬Ka(p∧¬Kbp)
and so it is certainly not commonly known.
The epistemic state transition induced by this update is visualized
in Figure 1. In the visualization, we link states that are the same for
an agent and label the link with the agent’s name, and we assume
reﬂexivity and transitivity of access. Please remember these conven-
tions; the following pictures will be more complex, and, unlike here,
transitivity of access may then play a part in the visualization.
Note that in this particular epistemic state, announcement of
Kap induces the same state transition as announcement of Ka(p ∧
¬Kbp). The ﬁrst remains true, but the second becomes false. For a
given state transition we can always ﬁnd a formula that induces it
and remains true. We will address that matter in Section 8.
Incidentally, [Ka(p∧¬Kbp)]¬Ka(p∧¬Kbp) is even valid: the an-




Figure 1. A simple unsuccessful update: Anne says to Bill “(p is true and) you
don’t know that p.”
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be executed at all. Mostly for the intuitive and motivating appeal of
formulas that ‘become common knowledge’, i.e. the successful ones,
we will focus on that, rather than on the ‘always unsuccessful’ ones,
that will therefore not be deﬁned or considered separately.
In between these extremes of ‘always successful’ and ‘always
unsuccessful’ there are also formulas that sometimes remain true,
and at other times – given other epistemic states – become false
after an announcement. An example of that is the (implicit) annou-
ncement of ‘nobody knows whether (s)he is muddy’ in the Muddy
Children problem, to be discussed in detail in Section 4. This for-
mula is successful for all rounds except the round where the muddy
children learn that they are muddy. Does this mean that ‘successful’
is not a ﬁxed property of a formula, but that it is relative to an epi-
stemic state? High time for further precision.
DEFINITION 1 (Successful formula). A formula ϕ ∈LN(P ) is suc-
cessful if and only if [ϕ]ϕ is valid. A formula is unsuccessful if and
only if it is not successful.
DEFINITION 2 (Successful update). Given a formula ϕ ∈ LN(P )
and an epistemic state (M, s).
– ϕ is successful in (M, s) if and only if M,s |= 〈ϕ〉ϕ
– ϕ is unsuccessful in (M, s) if and only if M,s |= 〈ϕ〉¬ϕ.
In the ﬁrst case ϕ is a successful update (in that epistemic state), and
in the last case that ϕ is an unsuccessful update (in that epistemic
state).
In the deﬁnitions, the switch between the ‘box’ and the ‘diamond’
versions of the announcement operator may puzzle the reader. In
the deﬁnition of a successful formula we really need the ‘box’-form:
clearly 〈ϕ〉ϕ is invalid for all ϕ except tautologies. But in the deﬁ-
nition of a successful update we really need the ‘diamond’-form:
clearly, whenever the announcement formula is false in an episte-
mic state, [ϕ]¬ϕ would therefore be true. That would not capture
the intuitive meaning of an unsuccessful update, because that is for-
mally represented as a feature of an epistemic state transition. We
must therefore assume that the announcement formula can indeed
be truthfully announced. This explains the difference between the
two deﬁnitions.
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Updates with true successful formulas are always successful, but
sometimes updates with unsuccessful formulas are successful. By ‘al-
ways’ (‘sometimes’) we mean ‘in all (some) epistemic states’. The
truth of the ﬁrst will be obvious: if a successful formula ϕ is true
in an epistemic state (M, s), then 〈ϕ〉ϕ is also true in that state,
so it is also a successful update. A typical example of the last,
to be explained in detail later, is the already mentioned action of
‘not stepping forward’ in Muddy Children, that was said to be
‘only unsuccessful in the last round and otherwise successful’. We
can actually distinguish different degrees of ‘success’, that will also
nicely match somewhat tentative distinctions made in the literature:
DEFINITION 3 (Individually/generally/publicly successful). Given a
formula ϕ ∈LN(P ) and an epistemic state (M, s).
– ϕ is individually successful in (M, s), or successful for agent n in
(M, s), if and only if M,s |= 〈ϕ〉Knϕ
– ϕ is generally successful in (M, s) if and only if M,s |= 〈ϕ〉Eϕ.
– ϕ is publicly successful in (M, s) if and only if M,s |= 〈ϕ〉Cϕ.
Similarly, we deﬁne individually, generally, and publicly unsuccessful,
e.g., ϕ is individually unsuccessful if M,s |= 〈ϕ〉Kn¬ϕ, etc.
Individually unsuccessful corresponds to 〈ϕ〉Kn¬ϕ and not to
〈ϕ〉¬Knϕ. The ﬁrst expresses that agent n knows ϕ to be false after
it has been announced. This is stronger than ϕ ‘merely’ being false
after the announcement: that may or may not be known to the agent.
Whereas the last already follows if ϕ is an unsuccessful update: if ϕ is
false after its announcement, this obviously cannot be known to any
agent. Nothing is therefore to be gained by such a distinction. The
other group notions of unsuccessful are similarly motivated. Note
that publicly successful implies generally successful implies individ-
ually successful implies successful (update), but not the other way
round. Similarly, publicly unsuccessful implies generally unsuccessful
implies individually unsuccessful implies unsuccessful (update), but
not the other way round. In particular, successful updates may well
be publicly unsuccessful. We did not make a similar distinction for
validities for a simple reason:
PROPOSITION 4. Let ϕ∈LN(P ). Then [ϕ]ϕ is valid if and only if
[ϕ]Cϕ is valid.
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Proof. Completeness allows for a very short proof: ‘ [ϕ]ϕ implies
 [ϕ]Cϕ’ is an instance of the rule for announcement and common
knowledge, for χ :=  and ψ := ϕ. The direction ‘ [ϕ]Cϕ implies
 [ϕ]ϕ’ rather trivially follows from Cϕ → ϕ (use of C), followed
by [ϕ]-necessitation and [ϕ]-normality, plus some propositional rea-
soning and MP.
COROLLARY 5. Let ϕ ∈ LN(P ). All the following validities are
equivalent: [ϕ]ϕ, [ϕ]Knϕ for some agent n, [ϕ]Eϕ, [ϕ]Cϕ.
So, for validities, the four notions of successful (‘as such’, individ-
ually, generally, publicly) all coincide, but for formulas in general,
they do not. In particular, [ϕ]ϕ is not logically equivalent to [ϕ]Cϕ.
The distinction is also useful, because it appears not to be made in
some relevant literature, in particular not in the original publication
(Gerbrandy 1999, pp. 100–101), Gerbrandy takes ‘individually suc-
cessful’ as the primitive notion for both successful updates and suc-
cessful formulas.
The following makes precise that the successful formulas ‘do
what we want them to do’: if true, they become common knowledge
when announced.
COROLLARY 6. [ϕ]ϕ is valid if and only if ϕ→ [ϕ]Cϕ is valid.
Which formulas are successful? The syntactic characterization of
successful formulas will be addressed in Section 8. An answer to this
question is not obvious, because some inductive ways to construct
the class of successful formulas fail: even if ϕ and ψ are successful,
¬ϕ, ϕ∧ψ , or ϕ→ψ may be unsuccessful.
Before we present our partial results towards characterization
of the successful updates, we show in detail concrete examples of
unsuccessful updates in relevant communicative settings. This forms
the main part of our contribution. It illustrates the relevance of our
subject matter to philosophical analysis and the analysis of multi-
agent systems.
4. MUDDY CHILDREN
The Muddy Children puzzle is one of the best known puzzles that
involve knowledge. It is known that versions of this puzzle were
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circulating in the ﬁfties. The earliest source of the puzzle we could
ﬁnd is a puzzle book by Gamow and Stern (1958). They present the
‘cheating wives’ version.
The great Sultan Ibn-al-Kuz was very much worried about the large number
of unfaithful wives among the population of his capital city. There were forty
women who were openly deceiving their husbands, but, as often happens, al-
though all these cases were a matter of common knowledge, the husbands in
question were ignorant of their wives’ behavior. In order to punish the wretched
women, the sultan issued a proclamation which permitted the husbands of
unfaithful wives to kill them, provided, however, that they were quite sure of the
inﬁdelity. The proclamation did not mention either the number or the names of
the wives known to be unfaithful; it merely stated that such cases were known
in the city and suggested that the husbands do something about it. However, to
the great surprise of the entire legislative body and the city police, no wife kill-
ings were reported on the day of the proclamation, or on the days that followed.
In fact, an entire month passed without any result, and it seemed the deceived
husbands just did not care to save their honor.
“O Great Sultan,” said the vizier to Ibn-al-Kuz, “shouldn’t we announce the
names of the forty unfaithful wives, if the husbands are too lazy to pursue the
cases themselves?”
“No,” said the sultan. “Let us wait. My people may be lazy, but they are cer-
tainly very intelligent and wise. I am sure action will be taken very soon.”
And, indeed, on the fortieth day after the proclamation, action suddenly broke
out. That single night forty women were killed, and a quick check revealed that
they were the forty who were known to have been deceiving their husbands.
(Gamow and Stern 1958, pp. 20–21).2
A version with cheating husbands rather than wives can be found in
Moses et al. (1986). Another version features wise men (McCarthy
1990). The version that is most popular today, and the version we
discuss in this paper, involves muddy children. It was introduced
in Barwise (1981). Given a group of children whose forehead may
be muddy or not, and who can only see the foreheads of other
children, a father announces that at least one of them is muddy,
and that those children who are sure whether their own forehead is
muddy, should step forward. If there are n children, then the n-th
time he announces this, all the muddy children step forward.
The ﬁrst analysis of this problem with epistemic logic was pre-
sented in Moses et al. (1986), where the dynamics were modelled
on the metalevel rather than in the logical language. The ﬁrst object
level treatment of this problem using the logic of public announce-
ments was by Plaza. (He called this logic the logic of public com-
munications and used slightly different notation.) An analysis of
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the problem using dynamic epistemic logic can be found in Jelle
Gerbrandy’s dissertation (Gerbrandy 1999).
The Muddy Children puzzle is a classic example of unsuccess-
ful updates: from the announcement that nobody knows whether
he or she is muddy, the muddy children may learn that they are
muddy. Although not stepping forward is strictly speaking not a
public announcement, because the children do not make an utter-
ance, pragmatically it is an announcement of their ignorance.
To give the general idea of the analysis using public announce-
ment logic, we look at the special case of three children Anne, Bill,
and Cath (a, b, and c). Let us suppose two of the children, Anne
and Bill, are muddy. After two announcements the muddy children
know that they are muddy. Intuitively this can be seen as follows.
Suppose you are Anne. Then you see that Bill is muddy and Cath is
not. Now the father says at least one of the children is muddy. From
this you can infer that if you are not muddy, Bill cannot see anyone
who is muddy, and therefore he would infer he is muddy. So if the
father now asks those children who know whether they are muddy
to step forward, and none step forward, you infer that Bill did not
know he was muddy. The only explanation for this is that you are
muddy yourself. Therefore, the next time the father asks you to step
forward if you know whether you are muddy, you step forward. The
situation is the same for Bill. Therefore he steps forward too.
We can represent the initial situation of the (three) muddy chil-
dren problem with a cube. Each of the three children can be
muddy or not. For this we introduce three propositional variables:
ma,mb,mc. Therefore there are eight possible states. In the gen-
eral case for n children, we get an ‘n-hypercube’, where the planes
correspond to the muddiness of the children. We call the model
for three children Cube. A picture of this model is shown in the
top of Figure 2. The states are labelled xyz, where x, y, z ∈ {0,1},
where x = 1 means that Anne is muddy, and y = 0 means that
Bill is not muddy, etc. In state 110, for instance, a and b are
muddy, but c is not. Let us assume that 110 is the actual state.
Although it is the case in 110 that everybody knows there is at
least one muddy child this is not common knowledge. For example
a considers it possible that b considers it possible that no child is
muddy. Formally, we have that Cube,110 |= E(m1 ∨ m2 ∨ m3), but
that Cube,110 |=¬C(m1 ∨m2 ∨m3), because 110∼a 010∼b 000 and
Cube,000 |=¬(m1 ∨m2 ∨m3).






























ma ∨ mb ∨ mc
¬((Kama ∨ Ka¬ma) ∨ (Kbmb ∨ Kb¬mb) ∨ (Kcmc ∨ Kc¬mc))
Figure 2. The top depicts the epistemic state where Anne and Bill are muddy,
and Cath is not. The ﬁrst transition depicts the effect of the announcement
that at least one child is muddy. The second transition depicts the effect of no
child stepping forward, i.e., an announcement that nobody knows whether (s)he
is muddy. This is an unsuccessful update. At the bottom epistemic state, Anne
and Bill know that they are muddy.
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In Figure 2 we have visualized the changes of information for
that situation. The ﬁrst announcement of the father says that at
least one of the children is muddy: ma ∨mb ∨mc. Let us abbreviate
this formula with muddy:
muddy=m1 ∨m2 ∨m3
The formula muddy is false in the state 000, therefore by the seman-
tics of public announcements presented in Section 2, we get a new
model where this state is eliminated, and the accessibility relations
are adapted accordingly. This is the model in the middle of Fig-
ure 2. One can simply check that Cube|muddy,110 |= Cmuddy.
Therefore muddy is successful in (Cube,110). But it is not only
successful in Cube, it is a successful formula, i.e. [muddy]muddy is
valid. After the announcement that at least one child is muddy, at
least one child is muddy.
The epistemic state we have thus acquired, has a special feature.
When one focuses on the state where exactly one child is muddy,
one sees that each of these states is indistinguishable from another
state for only two of the children. That means that one child knows
what the actual state would be if there were only one muddy child.
In particular, the child who knows what the actual state would be,
knows he is muddy. For instance:
Cube|muddy,100 |=Kama
Now the father asks those children who know whether they are
muddy to step forward. When no one steps forward, this means that
no child knows whether he or she is muddy. The formula that ex-
presses that at least one child knows whether he or she is muddy, is
knowmuddy (unlike ‘knowing that ϕ’, Kϕ, ‘knowing whether ϕ’ is
described by Kϕ∨K¬ϕ).
knowmuddy= (Kama ∨Ka¬ma)∨ (Kbmb ∨Kb¬mb)∨
(Kcmc ∨Kc¬mc)
The announcement made by the children not stepping forward is
¬knowmuddy. Consequently, those states where exactly one child is
muddy are eliminated by this announcement. By using the seman-
tics of Section 2 we get the bottom epistemic state shown in
Figure 2.
This last formula is unsuccessful in Cube|muddy,110. The
announcement that none of the children know whether they are
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muddy or not yields a situation where two children do know that
they are muddy. Before the announcement, both children know that
if he is not muddy, then the other child knows he is muddy. By learn-
ing that none of the children know, they can infer that they must be
muddy themselves. More formally:
Cube|muddy,110 |= 〈¬knowmuddy〉knowmuddy
So ¬knowmuddy is unsuccessful in (Cube|muddy,110). Is is also
individually unsuccessful for Anne and Bill in that epistemic state,





However, when all three children are muddy, ¬knowmuddy is a
successful update:
Cube|muddy,111 |= 〈¬knowmuddy〉¬knowmuddy
This is because in that state of the model, even at the bottom of
Figure 2, every child still considers it possible he or she is not
muddy.
The Muddy Children puzzle teaches some important lessons.
Firstly, it can be informative to announce something that every-
body knows. Every child knows at least one child is muddy, but the
announcement does give the children information. The fact becomes
common knowledge. The same formula can have different amounts
of success depending on the context. Moreover, as the example of
three muddy children showed, repetitions of the same announce-
ment can be informative.
5. SURPRISE EXAMINATION
The Surprise Examination paradox has a relatively short history
of about 60 years. Apparently the Swedish mathematician Lennart
Ekbom heard a message on the radio during World War II announc-
ing a civil defense exercise, which was to take place in the next
week. It was also announced that this exercise would be a surprise.
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Then he noticed that there was something paradoxical about this
announcement. Kvanvig (1998) and Sorensen (1988, pp. 253). The
paradox was ﬁrst published by O’Conner (1948):
Consider the following case. The military commander of a certain camp an-
nounces on a Saturday evening that during the following week there will be a
“Class A blackout”. The date and time of the exercise are not prescribed be-
cause a “Class A blackout” is deﬁned in the announcement as an exercise which
the participants cannot know is going to take place prior to 6.0 p.m. on the
evening in which it occurs. It is easy to see that it follows that the exercise can-
not take place at all. It cannot take place on Saturday because if it has not oc-
curred on the ﬁrst six days of the week it must occur on the last. And the fact
that the participants can know this violates the condition which deﬁnes it. Sim-
ilarly, because it cannot take place on Saturday, it cannot take place on Friday
either, because when Saturday is eliminated Friday is the last available day and
is, therefore, invalidated for the same reason as Saturday. And by similar argu-
ments, Thursday, Wednesday, etc., back to Sunday are eliminated in turn, so that
the exercise cannot take place at all. (O’Connor 1948)
One of the ﬁrst replies to this was that the exercise could take place
after all:
Suppose that the Commanding Ofﬁcer arranges for a blackout to take place dur-
ing the period covered by the announcement. Clearly the date of its occurrence
cannot be forecast from the announcement. So it will by deﬁnition be a Class-
A blackout, and he will be entirely justiﬁed in his announcement that a Class-A
blackout would take place during this period. (Scriven 1951)
There are many versions of this paradox. There is one involving a
prisoner that is sentenced to death by hanging on an unexpected
day, which is why the paradox is also known as the Hangman
Paradox. This version was introduced in Quine (1953). The ver-
sion which is most popular nowadays, introduced in Weiss (1952),
involves a surprise exam. A teacher announces to his students there
will be an exam next week, but the exact day of the exam will
be a surprise. We will study this version here. The ﬁrst analysis of
the Surprise Examination paradox with dynamic epistemic logic was
done by Gerbrandy in his dissertation. We follow his analysis.
The ﬁrst step of the analysis is to formalize the utterances of the
teacher. Let us take as the set of propositional variables the set {mo,
tu, we, th, fr}. The propositional variable “mo”, for instance, means
that the exam will take place on Monday. The announcement of the
teacher that there will be an exam next week, can easily be formal-
ized as






This is an exclusive disjunction over the possible days.
Gerbrandy distinguishes two readings of the second sentence that
is announced by the teacher:
1. Given the information the students now have, the students will not
know the day of the exam in advance.
2. The students will not know the day of the exam in advance, even
after they hear this announcement.
The ﬁrst sentence can be formalized in the language of the logic of
public updates. The second one however cannot be formalized us-
ing public announcement logic, because of the self-reference that is
involved in it. Let us start with a formalization of the ﬁrst reading.
Here we take Anne as a representative of the students:





The idea is a follows. First, if the exam is on Monday, she does not
know it. Next, after school has ﬁnished on Monday, if the exam is
on Tuesday, then late on Monday (when she has learned the exam
is not on Monday) she does not know the exam will be on Tuesday,
and so on.
The question is what happens to Anne’s information state when
the announcements are made. One can view these as two sepa-
rate announcements: ﬁrst exam and then surprise. If one insists
that all updates are successful, then one is committed to saying
that [exam][surprise]Ka(exam∧surprise). The ﬁrst thing to note is
that Ka(exam∧surprise) is inconsistent, because of the reductio ad
absurdum that eliminates all the days step by step. Suppose it is con-
sistent. The following reasoning can be done from Anne’s point of
view. Suppose exam is true. Therefore (mo∨ tu∨we∨ th∨ fr). We
proceed by cases. Suppose that the exam is on Friday, i.e. fr is true.
From exam it follows that (¬mo ∧ ¬tu ∧ ¬we ∧ ¬th ∧ fr). Then it
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follows from surprise that [¬mo][¬tu][¬we][¬th]¬Kafr. But we as-
sumed that (¬mo∧¬tu∧¬we∧¬th∧ fr). Therefore these announce-
ments can be executed. The result of their execution is an epistemic
state where Kafr is true, because only states where fr is true remain.
This contradicts the previous. So fr cannot be the case. Anne also
arrives at this conclusion therefore Ka¬fr. Using this we can now
proceed in the same way to derive Ka¬th and so on. Together this
contradicts Kaexam. This is not paradoxical, it simply means that
surprise is not successful for Anne.
Let us now look in detail at what happens to an epistemic
state that represents the situation when Anne is completely ignorant
about the truth values of the propositional variables, and ﬁrst learns
exam. The resulting model has ﬁve states. In each of these states ex-
actly one propositional variable is true. Let us assume that the exam
is actually on Monday. This is the state on the left in Figure 3. It is
easy to see that in this state (when the exam is on Monday) the last
four conjuncts of surprise are trivially true, because the antecedents
are false. The ﬁrst conjunct is true, because Anne does not know the
exam will be on Monday.
When we look at the other states in this model we see that the
only state where surprise is false, is the state where the exam is on
Friday. In that world fr is true and
[¬mo][¬tu][¬we][¬th]Kafr
also holds, because Friday would be the only remaining day Anne
considers to be possible. Therefore
fr→ [¬mo][¬tu][¬we][¬th]¬Kafr
is false and so surprise is false in this state. So the state where fr
is true is eliminated. That shows, that when surprise is announced,
Anne learns the exam will take place on another day than Friday.
The result of the announcement surprise yields the second model
of Figure 3.
So the only thing that the students learn from the second
announcement is that the exam will not take place on Friday,
but the reductio ad absurdum cannot go any further, because the
announcement is not individually successful. Anne does not know
that the day of the exam will be a surprise after the announcement.
If, however, the teacher repeats his announcement, Anne would be
able to eliminate another day, and this continues as long as the
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teacher can (truthfully) repeat it, as is shown in Figure 3. Assum-
ing the exam takes place on Monday, the teacher cannot repeat
his announcement after the fourth time: 〈surprise〉¬surprise is true
in the fourth model of Figure 3. In the ﬁrst three epistemic states
the announcement is successful (after the announcement the exam
would still be a surprise, given Anne’s information at that point),
although in all ﬁrst four epistemic states the announcement is not
individually successful.
The problem that still remains is another reading of the teacher’s
second announcement “The students will not know the day of the
exam, even after they hear this announcement.” It is clear that this
announcement is self-referential. Many analyses of the liar par-
adox blame the paradox on its self-referential nature. This also
seems to be the case here, the addition of “even after they hear
this announcement” forces the update to be successful, i.e. it forces
the children to conclude after the announcement that they will not
know the day of the exam in advance. This is inconsistent, as was
noted earlier, and it seems that as in the case of the liar, we can
blame the self-reference of the announcement.
6. CARD GAMES
Just as the Surprise Examination paradox, the Card Games exam-

























mosurprise surprise surprise surprise
Figure 3. Updates for the Surprise Examination paradox when the teacher’s
announcement is repeated and the exam is on Monday.
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Cluedo was invented by Elva and Anthony E. Pratt. Anthony Pratt
supposedly came up with the idea for the game while on nightly
ﬁre-patrol during blackouts, in the Birmingham area in 1943. This
‘murder-mystery’ game, ﬁrst published in the late 1940s, has been
hugely popular for over 50 years. ‘Normally’ Cluedo players gain
information, and win, because they exchange factual information
(conﬁrm or deny ownership of cards), but it turns out that a fully
rational Cluedo player, i.e. a perfectly logical reasoner only acting in
his own interests, may win because other rational players implicitly
announce epistemic information, namely that they cannot win (van
Ditmarsch 2002). One may think of such an action both as an invol-
untary action resulting in a loss, such as a ‘forced move resulting in
mate’ in chess, or as a voluntary action actively harming one’s inter-
ests, such as ‘scoring an own goal’ in soccer. First, we explain a bit
more about the game.
A murder is committed. The player who ﬁnds out who the mur-
derer is, what the murder weapon was, and in which room the mur-
der was committed, wins the game. The game is played on a game
board with a picture of the murder house, with nine rooms in it and
‘paths’ leading in a certain number of steps from one room to an-
other. There are six players. There are six guest cards, six weapon
cards, and nine room cards. The three categories of cards are shuf-
ﬂed separately. One suspect card, one weapon card and one room
card are blindly drawn and put apart. These ‘murder cards’ repre-
sent the actual murderer, the murder weapon and the murder room.
All remaining cards are shufﬂed together. They are then dealt to the
players. Every player gets three cards.
A player’s move consists of the following: Throw the dice. Try to
reach a room by walking your pawn over the game board. The num-
ber of steps on the board may not exceed the outcome of the throw
of dice. If a room is reached voice a suspicion about it, i.e. about a
guest, a weapon and that particular room. As a consequence of the
suspicion, the pawn with the same colour as that of the suspected
player is moved to the suspected room, and that weapon token is
placed in that room. Gather responses to that suspicion from the
other players. The other players respond to the suspicion in clock-
wise fashion: either a player doesn’t have any of the requested cards,
he says so, and the next player responds to the suspicion; or a player
holds at least one of the requested cards, he shows exactly one of
those to the requesting player only, and no further responses may be
gathered. You may now either end your move (who is next in turn
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is again determined clockwise) or, if you think you know enough,
make an accusation. An accusation is also the combination of a sus-
pect, a weapon and a room card, but it plays another role in the
game than a suspicion does: Each player can make an accusation
only once. It is not voiced but written down. The accusing player
then checks the three murder cards, without showing them to oth-
ers. If the accusation is false, that player has lost and the game con-
tinues. If the cards match the accusation, it is successful. The ﬁrst
player who makes a successful accusation, wins the game.
The logical description of some of these game moves requires a
dynamic epistemic logic that is slightly more involved than the logic
of public announcements: the action of showing a card to another
player with the remaining players ‘looking on’ is more complex than
a public announcement (Gerbrandy 1999; van Ditmarsch 2000; Bal-
tag et al. 2003). We merely highlight the implicit move that takes
place when you pass your turn to the next player: for a perfectly ra-
tional player this means that you are announcing that you cannot
win the game yet, or in other words, that you do not know what
the murder cards are. It is conceivable that this is so informative to
other players, that they therefore win if they are now to move, even
before asking a single question. And more than that: that in a sit-
uation where nobody can win, because somebody announces that,
somebody (else) can win: an unsuccessful update! An example where
the opponents gain factual knowledge from a given player’ inabil-
ity to win, is the following: suppose that in the ﬁrst move of the
game, Anne voices the suspicion ‘Green has done it with a knife
in the ballroom’. Nobody shows a card. If (and only if) Anne now
does not make a ﬁnal accusation, the other players can conclude
that those three cards cannot be the murder cards and that Anne
must hold at least one of them. In other words, they learn facts
about cards. Learning the murder cards, and then winning, is just
learning facts about very speciﬁc cards.
As the models and actions for the full game of Cluedo are rather
complex, we present the unsuccessful update by means of a sim-
pler example, namely only three players each holding one card. As-
sume that the players are Anne, Bill, and Cath (a, b, c), and that
they each hold one of the cards 0,1,2. The epistemic model describ-
ing this situation consists of six card deals. For example, 012 de-
scribes the deal where (in that order) Anne holds card 0, Bill holds
card 1, and Cath holds card 2; card deals where a player holds the
same card, are indistinguishable for that player. For example, Anne
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cannot distinguish 012 from 021. This induces obvious equivalence
relations for all players on this model. We call the model Hexa (see
Figure 4).
Assume that in epistemic state (Hexa,012) an outsider tells the
three players that the deal of cards is neither 201 nor 120. This
corresponds to the announcement ¬(2a ∧ 0b ∧ 1c)∧ ¬(1a ∧ 2b ∧ 0c).
Abbreviate Hexa|(¬(2a ∧ 0b ∧ 1c) ∧ ¬(1a ∧ 2b ∧ 0c)) as Hexa′. In
Hexa′ none of the agents know that the deal is 012, but all three
consider it possible for the other two to know it (see Figure 4). If
Anne now announces that she doesn’t know Bill’s card, then Cath
can derive Bill’s card from that announcement. Formally
Hexa′,012 |= [¬(Ka0b ∨Ka1b ∨Ka2b)](Kc0b ∨Kc1b ∨Kc2b)
The corresponding unsuccessful update actually is, that after Anne
says that she considers it possible that no player knows the card
deal, she no longer considers that possible, because she now knows
that both Bill and Cath know the card deal.
In full precision: Let δd be an atomic description of a card deal
(characteristic function of the state valuation), e.g. δ012 :=0a ∧¬1a ∧
¬2a ∧ ¬0b ∧ 1b ∧ ¬2b ∧ ¬0c ∧ ¬1c ∧ 2c. Then winn :=
∨
d∈D Knδd de-
scribes that agent n knows the deal of cards, where D is the current
set of states (card deals) in the domain, and win :=∨n∈N winn de-






















Figure 4. The effect of two announcements on the epistemic state for a card
deal where Anne holds 0, Bill holds 1, and Cath holds 2. The ﬁrst transition,
unlabelled, depicts the effect of ¬(2a ∧ 0b ∧ 1c) ∧ ¬(1a ∧ 2b ∧ 0c) (‘the deal is
neither 201 nor 120’). After Anne tells the others that she cannot win, both
Bill and Cath can win. In the form of an unsuccessful update: After Anne an-
nounces that she does not know if some player can win, she knows that some
player can win.
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although the conceptually more appealing description (that is not an
unsuccessful update) of Cath winning because Anne announces that
she cannot, is formally
Hexa′,012 |= 〈¬wina〉winc
Both yield the same transition for this epistemic state. We have visu-
alized the unsuccessful update in Figure 4. Another unsuccessful up-
date in Hexa′, inducing a different transition, is ¬win: this formula
only succeeds in point 012; therefore in the resulting singleton epi-
stemic state everybody can win!
In Cluedo, the goal is not full knowledge of the card deal, but
only partial knowledge, namely of the ownership of the murder
cards. The implicit action of announcing that you cannot win ap-
pears not to have been noted before (van Ditmarsch 2002). It is
highly relevant from a game theoretical perspective. Cluedo is a
game of imperfect information, where players’ optimal strategies de-
pend on their opponents’ strategies: Nash equilibria determine what
is optimal. Because ‘can’t win’ actions must also be modelled as part
of players’ strategies, they will also determine what is optimal. Spe-
ciﬁcally, strategies that were thought to have been optimal, may well
turn out to be suboptimal when ‘can’t win’ actions are also taken
into account. In plain words: suppose you’re in the heat of a Clue-
do game, have just arrived in the ballroom, and have to decide on
the best question to ask. It may well be that without ‘can’t win’ ac-
tions the best question to ask is – incorrectly – ‘Green did it with a
knife in the ballroom,’ but that with these actions the best question
to ask is ‘Scarlett did it with a rope in the ballroom’. Whether such
situations can really occur, is not yet known to us.
7. SECURITY PROTOCOLS
This application is about communicating agents (‘sender’ and ‘re-
ceiver’) that try to keep the content of their communications from
eavesdroppers that are listening in. The details are of a rather com-
binatorial character, which will therefore not be presented in great
detail. The rough idea is, that the information that is to be conveyed
is ‘weakened’ by presenting this in the presence of various alter-
natives. As long as the receiving party has enough informational
advantage over the eavesdropper(s), the communication can be suc-
cessful while the secret is kept. The topic is partly rooted in 19th
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century born design theory (Kirkman 1847), a subdiscipline of com-
binatorial mathematics that investigates how many different ways
there are to convey information, such as these secrets. Its interest
to the philosophical community is mainly due to the curious way
in which pragmatics and semantics are mixed up: publicly known
intentions of agents involved in protocols become part of the mean-
ing of their statements, in other words: the pragmatics are drawn
into the semantics. We regard this as highly relevant for the analysis
of knowledge and belief change. By way of the semantic modelling
of such intentions, we can explain scenarios in which they are ‘self-
defeating’ in the precise sense of an unsuccessful update.
The speciﬁc setting is the ‘seven cards’ or ‘Russian cards’ prob-
lem. This was ﬁrst posed in the 2000 Moscow Mathematics Olym-
piad, to which it was suggested by A. Shapovalov. An extensive
analysis of its epistemic aspects can be found in van Ditmarsch
(2003), see also Makarychev and Makarychev (2001).
Given are three players, Anne, Bill, and Cath, and a pack of seven known cards,
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Anne and Bill each draw three cards and Cath gets the remain-
ing card. Anne and Bill want to openly (publicly) inform each other about their
cards, without Cath learning from any of their cards who holds it.
Assume that Anne has drawn 0, 1, and 2, and Bill 3, 4, and 5, so that Cath gets
card 6. Anne now says, publicly: “I have {0,1,2}, or I don’t have any of these
cards,” after which Bill says, also publicly: “Cath has card 6.”
These two announcements do not solve the problem. Using
Anne’s intention to keep her cards a secret from Cath, Anne
actually reveals all her cards to Cath. Why is that so, and why does
it appear to solve the problem?
Obviously, Bill immediately derives Anne’s hand from her
announcement: if Anne had none of 0, 1, and 2, Bill should have
had at least two of those. But he does not. Also, Cath seems unable
to pin down any speciﬁc card on Anne from that announcement,
e.g., both 012 and 345 still appear possible hands for Anne: if she
held 345, indeed that includes none of 0, 1, and 2. Beyond that, the
underlying protocol seems ‘safe’ enough from Anne’s point of view:
if she had said instead ‘I do not have card 6’ that would not have
been informative to Cath either, but rather risky for Anne, who does
not know at this stage whether Cath holds card 6 or not, and if Cath
had held card 5, she would have derived from Anne’s announcement
that Bill holds 6: a loss again. Further, Bill’s announcement informs





012.345.6 012.346.5 012.356.4 012.456.3
345.012.6 346.012.5 356.012.4 456.012.3
345.016.2 346.015.2 356.014.2 456.013.2
345.026.1 346.025.1 356.024.1 456.023.1






















012.345.6 012.346.5 012.356.4 012.456.3a a a
012a∨ (¬0a ∧ ¬1a2a)
Kacignorant
Figure 5. The results of Anne’s announcement and of her intention. The second
transition depicts the unsuccessful update: note that Kacignorant is false in the
ﬁnal state.
Anne of Bill’s cards, namely the remaining three, and Cath already
knew which card she held, so that doesn’t help her much either.
To understand what is wrong completely, we resort to a formal
analysis. The underlying models are completely analogous to those
for Cluedo, and to Hexa:
We call the model where the cards have been dealt: Rus. A deal
of cards where Anne holds 0, 1, and 2, Bill holds 3, 4, and 5, and
Cath holds 6, is represented by 012.345.6, etc. The epistemic model
representing the information players have about each other, is de-
ﬁned using the same modelling principles as in Hexa: it is com-
monly known what the deck of cards is, how many cards each
‘player’ holds, and that players only know their own hand of cards.
Anne’s ﬁrst announcement is described by the formula
012a ∨ (¬0a ∧¬1a ∧¬2a)
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Abbreviate this as announce. Cath’s ignorance about Anne’s and




After an update of (Rus,012.345.6) with announce we reach the
information state pictured in Figure 5. One can easily check in the
ﬁgure that Anne indeed knows that Cath is ignorant of her cards af-
ter her announcement. (All of the four deals in the ﬁrst row, that
represent ‘what Anne knows given the actual deal’, have a single
alternative for Cath, namely the deal in the row directly beneath it,
in which the hands of Anne and Bill are swapped: so Cath can-
not determine ownership of any of those cards.) However, Cath
doesn’t know that, and, surprisingly, Cath can derive factual knowl-
edge from that ignorance. Let us ﬁrst walk through the ﬁgure, to
establish that Cath does not know that Anne knows that Cath is
ignorant: or, in other words, to establish that Cath can imagine that
Anne can imagine that Cath knows.
For Cath, after the update with announce, deal 012.345.6 can
still not be distinguished from deal 345.012.6 (below 012.345.6 in
the ﬁgure). But in 345.012.6 Anne does not know that Cath is igno-
rant: in that case, Anne would have considered it possible that the
deal was, e.g., 345.016.2 (below 345.012.6 in the ﬁgure). And if
the deal had been 345.016.2, Cath would have known that Bill has
cards 0 and 1 (as this holds for all four deals in the row containing
345.016.2, in the ﬁgure).
Why is this informative for Cath? Cath rightfully assumes that
Anne wouldn’t dare make an announcement that might inform her.
In other words, it is not merely required that Cath is ignorant after
Anne’s announcement, but also that Anne knows that Cath is igno-
rant, ‘and this is commonly known to all’. Another way of saying
that, is that Anne ‘really’ says: “announce is true, and after having
said that, Cath still doesn’t know my cards.” Formally: announce∧
[announce]Kacignorant. This is equivalent to the sequence of two
announcements announce and Kacignorant (see the derived prin-
ciples in Section 2). Restriction of the model resulting from an-
nounce to the states where Kacignorant is true, retains only the top
four states in the ﬁgure (see the transition there). And in that state
Cath knows the entire card deal. So cignorant is false, and a fortiori
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Kacignorant is false too. In an overview (for convenience we stick to
the box-version of the dynamic operators):
Rus,012.345.6 |= [announce∧ [announce]Kacignorant]¬Kacignorant
Rus,012.345.6 |= [announce][Kacignorant]¬Kacignorant
Rus|announce,012.345.6 |= [Kacignorant]¬Kacignorant
The second update, on Kacignorant, is merely explicitizing Anne’s
intentions. Without those intentions, just updating with announce
would have sufﬁced. This would have happened if an outsider –
having no interest in keeping or communicating secrets – had said
“Anne has either hand {0,1,2}, or none of those cards.” So, Cath
only learns Anne’s cards from Anne’s intention to prevent Cath
learning her cards. Without that intention, Cath would not have
learnt Anne’s cards.
By now the reader may wonder how the Russian Cards Problem
can be solved anyway. For that, think, or see the references! There
are various non-trivial solutions.
8. SYNTACTIC CHARACTERIZATION OF SUCCESSFUL UPDATES
We have deﬁned the successful formulas, and the various related no-
tions, semantically. What is the fragment of the logical language that
consists of the successful formulas? We have not fully answered this
question yet, nor, as far as we know, has this been answered by oth-
ers. Public announcement logic is decidable, so one can also decide
whether a formula is successful or not, but we would like to be able
to say so in a straightforward way only using the syntactic form of
the formula. In this section, we report on our progress and the re-
sults of other researchers.
Let us start with some negative results. Even when ϕ and ψ are
successful, their conjunction may be unsuccessful: For example, p∧
¬Knp is unsuccessful, but both p and ¬Knp are successful. That
may be not immediately clear for the last case, therefore we present
the – short – proof:
Let M, s be arbitrary. We have to prove that M,s |= [¬Knp]¬Knp,
in other words, that M,s |=¬Knp implies M|¬Knp, s |=¬Knp. Let
M,s |=¬Knp. Then there must be a t ∼n s such that M, t |=¬p, and
therefore also M, t |=¬Knp, and therefore t ∈M|¬Knp. From s ∼n t
in M|¬Knp and M|¬Knp, t |=¬p follows M|¬Knp, s |=¬Knp.
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Also ϕ may be successful but ¬ϕ unsuccessful, and (obviously)
vice versa. For example, even though the negation of that formula is
obviously unsuccessful, ¬(p ∧¬Knp) is successful. Instead of a di-
rect proof, it sufﬁces to observe that ¬(p ∧¬Knp) is equivalent to
¬p∨Knp, and that that formula is in the language fragment that is
preserved under taking arbitrary submodels, and therefore a fortiori
under the unique submodel resulting from its announcement. This
is generalized in Proposition 8 (see below).
Finally ϕ and ψ may be successful but [ϕ]ψ not. Consider a
model M with {s, t} as the set of possible worlds. There is only one
accessibility relation ∼a= {(s, s), (s, t, ), (t, s), (t, t)} and only one
propositional variable p, which is only true in t , i.e. Vp = {t}. We
take the epistemic state (M, s). Now consider the formula [¬p →
Ka¬p]⊥. The subformulas ¬p→Ka¬p and ⊥ are both successful.
However (M, s) |= 〈[¬p → Ka¬p]⊥〉¬[¬p → Ka¬p]⊥. This can be
seen as follows. The formula ¬p→Ka¬p is true in t , but false in s.
Therefore [p →Kap]⊥ is trivially true in s. It is obviously false in
t . So M restricted to this formula consists of s only. In this model
¬p→Ka¬p is true. Therefore 〈¬p→Ka¬p〉, which is equivalent
to [¬p→Ka¬p]⊥, is true there as well.
There are some results. First, common knowledge formulas are
successful:
PROPOSITION 7. (van Ditmarsch (2003)) . Let ϕ ∈ LN(P ). Then
[Cϕ]Cϕ is valid.
Proof. Let M, s be arbitrary. Observe that M,s |= Cϕ implies
M|Cϕ, s |=Cϕ: the truth of a proposition is determined by the set
of N -accessible states.3 But that implication is the simple result of
applying the semantical deﬁnition to M,s |= [Cϕ]Cϕ.
By announcing a common knowledge formula, no accessible states
are deleted from the model. Obviously the truth of formulas can
only change by an announcement if their truth value depends on
states that are deleted by the announcement. We will now show
that formulas from the following large fragment Lu0N (of the logi-
cal language LuN assumed throughout) of the preserved formulas with
inductive deﬁnition
ϕ ::=p | ¬p | ϕ∧ψ | ϕ∨ψ | Knϕ | Cϕ | [¬ϕ]ψ
are truth preserving under ‘deleting states’. From this, it also follows
that the fragment is successful. Instead of ‘deleting states’, we say
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that we restrict ourselves to a submodel: a restriction of a model to
a subset of the domain, with the obvious restriction of access and
valuation to that subset.
PROPOSITION 8. (preservation). Fragment Lu0N is preserved under
submodels.
Proof. By induction on Lu0N . The case for propositional variables,
conjunction, and disjunction is straightforward.
Let M = 〈S,∼, V 〉 be given and let M ′ = 〈S ′,∼′, V ′〉 be a sub-
model of it. Suppose s ∈ S ′. Suppose (M, s) |=Knϕ. Let s ′ ∈ S ′ and
s ∼n s ′. Therefore s ∼n s ′, and so by the semantics we have (M, s ′) |=
ϕ. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis (M ′, s ′) |= ϕ. Therefore
(M ′, s) |=Knϕ. The case for Cϕ is completely analogous.
Suppose (M, s) |= [¬ϕ]ψ . Suppose, towards a contradiction, that
(M ′, s) 	|= [¬ϕ]ψ . Therefore, by the semantics, (M ′, s) |= ¬ϕ and
(M ′|¬ϕ, s) 	|=ψ . Therefore, by using the contrapositive of the induc-
tion hypothesis, also (M, s) |= ¬ϕ. Moreover M ′|¬ϕ is a submod-
el of M|¬ϕ, because a state t ∈ S ′ only survives if (M ′, t) |= ¬ϕ,
therefore by the induction hypothesis (M, t) |=¬ϕ. So S ′|¬ϕ⊆S|¬ϕ.
But from (M, s) |= [¬ϕ]ψ (which we assumed) and (M, s) |= ¬ϕ
follows (M|¬ϕ, s) |= ψ , therefore by the induction hypothesis also
(M ′|¬ϕ, s) |=ψ . This contradicts our earlier assumption. Therefore
(M ′, s) |= [¬ϕ]ψ .
For a similar fragment, namely without common knowledge
and without any announcement operators, this was proved in
van Benthem (2002).However, also the converse held for that fragment,
i.e. if a formula of the language is preserved under submodels, then it is
in the fragment. It is unknown whether this also holds for Lu0N .
COROLLARY 9. Let ϕ ∈Lu0N and ψ ∈LuN . Then ϕ→ [ψ ]ϕ is valid.
COROLLARY 10. Let ϕ ∈Lu0N . Then ϕ→ [ϕ]ϕ is valid.
COROLLARY 11. (all preserved formulas are successful). Let
ϕ ∈Lu0N . Then [ϕ]ϕ is valid.
We have found successful formulas outside Lu0N , such as ¬Knp, see
above. There are more successful formulas than preserved formulas,
because the entailed requirement that ϕ → [ψ ]ϕ is valid for arbitrary
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ψ is much stronger than the requirement that ϕ→ [ϕ]ϕ is valid. In the
last case we are only looking at the very speciﬁc submodel resulting
from the announcement of that formula, not at arbitrary submodels.
The result formulated in Proposition 8 is rather like a result of
Gerbrandy (1999, pp. 100–101). He proved, for a slightly differ-
ent notion of (successful) updates, and a language without common
knowledge, that formulas are successful if epistemic formulas do not
occur within the scope of an odd number of negations.
A syntactic characterization of the whole successful fragment of
the language is still not found. We hope to continue making pro-
gress on that.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
We have focused on formulas that, when announced, become false:
unsuccessful updates. The appropriate logic to investigate this phe-
nomenon is the logic of public announcements, and part of our con-
tribution is to give clear concepts concerning successful formulas
and successful updates and some of their elementary semantic prop-
erties. We presented four case studies involving unsuccessful updates,
that have not previously been presented together with this particular
focus in mind.
We hope that this paper will induce others to alert us to other
occurrences of unsuccessful updates in particular in the philosophi-
cal literature. We surmise that, even apart from ‘Moore-problems’,
many others may have struggled with these matters in the past.
Actually, even in the area of ‘mathematical recreation’ there are
examples that we have chosen to overlook, because of their mainly
combinatorial interest. For example, the famous ‘sum and prod-
uct’-riddle, where two persons communicate to each other, their
ignorance and knowledge concerning the sum and product of two
natural numbers that they have been told, masterfully uses the
power of unsuccessful updates. For that, see Freudenthal (1969), or
for an epistemic treatment, Plaza (1989).
One important technical concern that we hope to resolve in the
near future is the syntactic characterization of successful formulas.
Beyond that, there are some generalizations of the concepts of suc-
cessful and unsuccessful execution: an announcement is just one
of many conceivable epistemic actions. A formula that when an-
nounced becomes false, is in other words a formula that cannot be
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announced twice in succession. A generalization of that is the action
that cannot be executed twice. An action cannot be executed twice
if its precondition is an unsuccessful update.
We hope that the underlying investigation and our continued ef-
forts to enhance our understanding will show the enduring relevance
of this subject matter for philosophical and epistemological investi-
gations.
NOTES
1 The proof system in Table I is complete if the logical language is extended with
action composition and the standard PDL axiom for composition. This issue is
beyond the scope of this paper.
2 Erik Krabbe pointed out to us that Gamow and Stern made a slight error and
should have said action suddenly broke out on the 39th day instead of the fortieth.
3 It seems difﬁcult to be more precise here without being cumbersome. Let’s
make an attempt after all: Given the assumption M,s |= Cϕ, observe that
s ∼N s ′ implies M,s ′ |= Cϕ. In other words: [s]∼N = {s ′ ∈ D(M) | s ∼N s ′} ⊆
{s ′ ∈ D(M) | M,s ′ |= Cϕ}. But that’s another way of saying that M|[s]∼N ⊆
M|Cϕ – where we use M|[s]∼N par abus de langage in its obvious meaning of
‘N -reduced model’. Therefore, given the assumption, M,s |=Cϕ is equivalent to
M|[s]∼N , s |=Cϕ is equivalent to M|Cϕ, s |=Cϕ.
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